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The promoters of the gigantic monopolies and trusts which are
daily becoming more numerous, in their zeal to stifle all competition
sometimes overreach themselves and exact from the concerns which
they absorb covenants which the courts refuse to enforce as being in
unreasonable restraint of trade. An interesting illustration of this is
seen in a recent case in New Jersey, Trenton Potteries Co. v. Olihant,
39 Atl. Rep. 923. Five of the seven potteries in Trenton engaged in
the production of sanitary ware, and making about seventy-five per
cent of the entire output of the country, were bought up and united
into the Trenton Potteries Co. From Oliphant & Co., one of the
vendors, an agreement was taken by which they jointly and severally
agreed not to engage, directly or indirectly for fifty, years, in manu-
facturing pottery, except as agents or employees of the Trenton Pot-
teries Co., anywhere within the United States, except Nevada and
Arizona. A couple of years later the Bellmark Pottery Co., was incor-
porated by other parties, and four of the members of Oliphant & Co.
took four-fifths of the stock and actively participated in its manage-
ment-i. e., were much more than mere stockholders. The Trenton
Co. then sought to enforce the covenant, but the court in a learned
opinion by Vice-Chancellor Grey refused to enjoin them.
The broad statement of the rule that contracts in general restraint
of trade are void, and that contracts in partial restraint are valid, can
no longer be maintained. The authority of Mitchell v. Reynolds, i P.
Wins. x8i-the leading case on this subject, decided in 17I i-has
never been questioned, although there has been some modification of
its principles and variation in their application. Several.cases in Eng-
land have upheld covenants restraining the covenantor throughout
the whole Kingdom and even in foreign parts, where the business
extended over such an area, because under these circumstances the
restraintwas reasonably necessaryfor the protection of the covenantee;
Jones v. Lees, i H. and N. 189; Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 645;
Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. 35'; .ikaxim-Nordenfelt Case [1893].
i Ch. Div. 630; Lord Justice Fry, in Rousillon v. Rousillon, saying
that the protection of the covenantee, and not the interests of the
public which was the original basic principle of the rule, is the only
test of the reasonableness of the contract. And in these days of
enlarged business relations and connections often reaching out over
almost the whole world, there seems no good reason why, when the
restraint is co-extensive only with the interest to be protected and
with the benefit meant to be conferred, the covenant should not be
upheld. And with regard to partial restraints, the rule is, not that
they are good, but that they may be good, and that they will be good
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provided the restraint be reasonable. And to be reasonable it must
be no greater than is reasonably necessary-i. e., the excepted area
must not have been chosen merely to avoid the disfavor of the law
and to force the covenantors as far away as possible, in the attempt to
actually prohibit competition, which appears to have been done in
this case, as pottery cannot be manufactured in Nevada and Arizona,
and the business when sold did not extend beyond the Mississippi.
And its reasonableness must be tested by the extent of the business
at the time of making the sale, and the covenant, and not by its future
growth, when it may have extended over the whole country.
It may seem that this case goes against the leading American case
of Diamond Mfatch Co. v. Roeber, io6 N. Y. 473, where the covenant
was not to engage in the same business for ninety-nine years any-
where in the United States except Nevada and Montana, but in
reality it does not hold contra, for in that case the court expressly
refers to the fact that the business extended over the whole United
States and follows the English cases in upholding the covenant. In
Lufkin Rule Co. v. Eringel. 49 N. E. Rep. 1030, a recent case in Ohio.
the agreement was not to engage in the same business in the State of
Ohio or the United States, the business being limited to certain sec-
tions of the country. and the court refused to enforce the covenant.
It questions the soundness of the rule that the question of reasonable-
ness is one wholly between the parties, and, following the economical
school which opposes all monopolies and combinations restricting free
competition as against public policy, declares that the interest of the
public must now be considered more than ever before. But contracts
in general restraint of trade, when the trade is general, no more tend.
to create monopolies, than contracts in partial restraint, where the
trade is only local. In either case the community where the business
extends, and there only. are deprived of the services of the cove-
nantor, and that, for the reasonable protection of the covenantee.
whose motive, unless malicious, in exacting the agreement cannot
legally be inquired into, though he have the very purpose of prevent-
ing competition dnd-controlling all the output.
There has been recently rendered in the Supreme Court of the
United States, in United States v. Wong .Kim Ark, 18 Sup. Ct.. 457, a
decision upon the old question of the citizenship of persons born
within the limits of the United States of alien parents. It appears to
be the first time that this question has been directly decided in this
Court, although it has frequently been incidentally involved ,in
previous cases; and the rule here laid down is apparently a ratifica-
tion of the decisions heretofore reached in the various state and cir-
cuit courts. The individual whose citizenship was under discussion
was of Chinese extraction, and claimed the rights of a citizen by
reason of birth here. -The Court deals with the question very ex-
haustively,. and laying its foundation upon the assumption that the
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common-law rule of England that "every child born in England of
alien parents is a natural born subject, unless the child of a public
minister of a foreign state, or an alien enemy," was in force in the
colonies at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and pre-
vailed in the United States thereafter, holds that this rule is but re-
enacted in the Civil Rights Act of x866, and in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Although hopelessly in the minority, Chief-Justice Fuller, with
whom Mr. Justice Harlan agrees, dissents from this opinion, and, upon
what appears to be the better view, holds that the common law of
England does not control the question under discussion. He very
aptly shows that if the English rule governs, then all children born
abroad of American citizens, since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, become by such birth subjects of the country wherein
they are born, and in order to become American citizens must be
naturalized as any other alien. But the English rule emphatically
denies the right to change one's allegiance; while the United States has
always upheld the right of expatriation. Moreover, in this country,
the alien must be permanently domiciled, while in Great Britain
birth during mere temporary sojourn is sufficient to render the child
a British subject.
But both by our treaty with China and by statute, the right of
citizenship is forbidden to this applicant. To put upon the Four-
teenth Amendment the construction urged by the majority of the
Court is to "override both treaty and statute." The exercise of the
right of deportation which we also have would under this construction
cause the permanent separation of many families.
The Fourteenth Amendment was founded on the act of 1866,
which contained the words, "and not subject to any foreign power."
But these words were not necessary to shut out the children of public
ministers of foreign states nor alien enemies, since by their birth they
were not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof;" hence they must have
been inserted to exclude the children born here of resident aliens.
Although it is but recently that electricity was first employed
commercially, there have been numerous decisions firmly establish-
ing the principle that telegraph and telephone companies can be com-
pelled to furnish service, not only at a reasonable price, but also to
all persons, without discrimination, who may make application for
such service. This principle has not until recently however, been
applied to companies furnishing electricity for lighting purposes,
although there does not appear to be any good reason why they
should stand in any different position from that occupied by the tele-
graph and telephone companies.
In the recently determined case of Cincinnati, H. &- 1. R. Co., v.
Village of Bowling Green, 49 N. E. Rep. 121, an attempt was made by
an incorporated village to compel, under a State statute, a railroad to
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illuminate with certain electric lights its tracks lying within the limits
of said village; and upon a contention by the railroad that they were.
by being obliged to use a certain system of lamps and attachments,
the exclusive right to maintain which had been granted to the elec-
tric lighting company there situated, thereby placed at the mercy of
that company the court laid down the following rule, "An electric
light company, owning an electric plant, and engaged in furnishing
light to the inhabitants of a city or village, and in lighting the streets
thereof, has so far devoted its property to a public use that it is
bound to furnish light within such city or village impartially to all
applicants, at a reasonable price." This conclusion seems eminently
just, since gas companies, although furnishing light by another
methqd, have repeatedly been held under obligations to furnish indis-
criminately to all, and there certainly can be nothing in the medium
itself upon which any freedom from such a duty could be based.
Revised Statutes §§5197. 5198, provide that national banks may
take interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State where the
bank is located and no more. that knowingly taking a greater rate
shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest, which the note
"carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon," and
that in case the greater rate has been "paid," the payor may recover
back in an action of debt commenced within two years, twice the
amount so paid. In the case of Brown v. Marion National Bank, the
Supreme Court construed these sections with reference to renewal
notes. which included usurious interest. The Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky held that interest included in a renewal note was "paid" and
had thereby become new interest-bearing principal. But interest
included in a renewal note or evidenced by a separate note is not paid
within the meaning of the Act, says Justice Harlan, nor is the forfeit-
ure thus waived, for a clear distinction is made between interest which
a note "carries with it" and interest "paid," and if interest included
in a renewal note were "paid," then the borrower could immediately
sue the lender and recover back twice the amount of interest thus paid,
when in fact he had not paid the debt nor any part of the interest, as
such. The sum included in the renewal note. in excess of the sum
originally loaned, is interest which that note "carries with it or which
has been agreed to be paid," and not, as to any part of it, interest
paid. "No matter how many renewals may have been made, if the
bank has charged a greater rate of interest than the law allows, it
must, if the forfeiture clause of the statute be relied on, and the mat-
ter is thus brought to the attention of the court, lose the entire inter-
est which the note carries or which has been agreed to be paid."
But where the interest has actually been paid, then it can not be set
up by way of counter claim or set-off in an action on the note, but
the remedy given by the statute-a separate suit-is the only remedy
available. Barnet v. Vational Bank, 98 U. S. 555.
